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I. INTRODUCTION
This Article summarizes and analyzes important cases decided by the
United States Supreme Court, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, and
the Texas courts of appeals from December 1, 2019, to November 30,
2020.
II. CONFESSIONS
Voluntariness has long been a prerequisite for the admission of a con-
fession under both state and federal law.1 The U.S. Supreme Court has
recognized “two constitutional bases for the requirement that a confes-
sion be voluntary to be admitted into evidence: the Fifth Amendment
right against self-incrimination and the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment.”2
Under the Fifth Amendment, a confession obtained through custodial
interrogation is presumptively involuntary unless police advise a suspect
of their Miranda rights and obtain a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent
waiver.3 Under the Due Process Clause, a defendant can establish that
their confession was involuntary by showing that the police engaged in
objectively coercive misconduct that overbore the defendant’s will and
that the defendant confessed because of the misconduct.4 Where Miranda
is inapplicable, the traditional Due Process Clause standard of voluntari-
ness still must be satisfied.5
Articles 38.21 and 38.22 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure deal
with confessions. Article 38.21 contains the general rule that, “[a] state-
ment of an accused may be used in evidence against him if it appears that
1. Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 587 (1884) (applying the common law voluntariness
standard). By 1857, Texas codified the voluntariness requirement in Article 661 of the 1857
Code of Criminal Procedure: “The confession of a defendant may be used in evidence
against him, if it appear that the same was freely made without compulsion or persuasion,
under the rules hereafter prescribed.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 661 (1857). That provi-
sions remains almost identical today. See id. art. 38.21.
2. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 433 (2000) (citing Bram v. United States,
168 U.S. 532, 542 (1897)) (stating that the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimina-
tion controls when the question is whether a confession was voluntary); Brown v. Missis-
sippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936) (holding that the Due Process Clause prohibited confessions
obtained by physical coercion because they are involuntary). The Due Process Clause was
the only remedy under federal law for a state defendant until 1964 when the Fifth Amend-
ment right against self-incrimination was applied to the states. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1,
3–5 (1964).
3. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444–45 (1966).
4. Lopez v. State, 610 S.W.3d 487, 494 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020).
5. Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737, 740 (1966).
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the same was freely and voluntarily made without compulsion or persua-
sion . . . .”6 Article 38.22 requires not only that statements be voluntary,
but also it specifically addresses statements of an accused made during a
custodial interrogation.7
Under both the Due Process Clause and Articles 38.21 and 38.22, the
voluntariness of a confession is reviewed by examining the totality of the
circumstances.8
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
1. Lopez v. State
In Lopez v. State, the appellant, Antonio Lopez, confessed to killing his
eleven-month-old foster child.9 He subsequently filed a motion to sup-
press, arguing that his confession was involuntary under the Due Process
Clause and Article 38.21 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.10 Ac-
cording to Lopez, he only confessed because police threatened to arrest
his wife if he did not and they also told him that, if that happened, Child
Protective Services might remove their children.11 The police investiga-
tion showed that the appellant and his wife were the only adults home,
there was no evidence of a break-in, and the evidence showed that the
children present in the home were not strong enough to cause the injuries
that killed the victim.12 The appellant’s motion was denied and findings
of facts and conclusions of law were filed by the trial court.13 The jury
found him guilty of murder but acquitted him of capital murder and sen-
tenced him to thirty-five years of incarceration.14
The appellant appealed. The Eighth El Paso Court of Appeals affirmed
his conviction, concluding that the appellant’s confessions were volun-
6. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.21.
7. Article 38.22, Section 2 governs the admission of written statements made in a
custodial setting. Id. art. 38.22, § 2. Article 38.22, Section 3 deals with oral and sign lan-
guage statements. Id. § 3. Both require that a person be warned before giving a statement
that:
(1) he has the right to remain silent and not make any statement at all and
that any statement he makes may be used against him at his trial;
(2) any statement he makes may be used as evidence against him in court;
(3) he has the right to have a lawyer present to advise him prior to and dur-
ing any questioning;
(4) if he is unable to employ a lawyer, he has the right to have a lawyer
appointed to advise him prior to and during any questioning; and
(5) he has the right to terminate the interview at any time.
Id. § 2(a) (written statements); id. § 3(a)(2) (oral and sign language statements). They also
require that the accused knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive those rights after
being warned. Id. § 2(b) (waiver of warnings required for written statements); id. § 3(a)(2)
(waiver of warnings required for oral and sign language statements).
8. Armstrong v. State, 718 S.W.2d 686, 693 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985).
9. Lopez, 610 S.W.3d at 488.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 488–89, 491.
13. Id. at 488.
14. Id.
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tary.15 The court of appeals reached that result after adopting a probable-
cause analysis under which it concluded a confession is always voluntary
when it is based on police threats to arrest a close family member, so long
as police have probable cause to arrest the close family member when the
threat is made.16
The appellant subsequently filed a petition for discretionary review, ar-
guing that the court of appeals erroneously concluded that his confession
was voluntary. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals began by noting
that, to prevail on a Due Process Clause voluntariness claim, an appellant
must show that the police engaged in objectively coercive conduct not-
withstanding the appellant’s mental condition.17 The court referenced the
U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Colorado v. Connelly, in which the Su-
preme Court held a confession voluntary even though the petitioner was
driven by the voice of God when he confessed to police because police
did nothing to coerce the petitioner.18 But under Article 38.21 of the
Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, the court explained, courts can con-
sider not only police overreach, but also the defendant’s state of mind.19
The court also noted that although the court of appeals correctly said
that the voluntariness of a confession under the Due Process Clause and
Article 38.21 is reviewed by examining the totality of the circumstances, it
deviated from that standard when it concluded that the appellant’s con-
fession was voluntary because police had probable cause to arrest his wife
when they threatened him.20 The court observed that the court of ap-
peals’ adoption of the probable-cause analysis was due to a misreading of
the court’s earlier decision in Contreras v. State.21 In that decision, the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals discussed in dicta that some jurisdic-
tions have adopted a probable-cause analysis, but it specifically declined
to decide the issue because it was not necessary to the disposition of the
case.22
15. Id.
16. Id. at 494–95. Probable cause is discussed more in Section III(c)(1).
17. Id.
18. Id. (citing Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167–70 (1986)).
19. “Claims of involuntariness under Article 38.22 can be, but need not be, predicated
on police overreaching.” Id. at 495. They can also involve “‘sweeping inquiries into the
state of mind of a criminal defendant who has confessed’ . . . that are not of themselves
relevant to due process claims.” Id. (citations omitted). This is because the state voluntari-
ness requirement protects suspects from themselves, not only police overreach, as does the
Due Process Clause. Id.
20. Id. at 496–97.
21. Id. at 497; see Contreras v. State, 312 S.W.3d 566, 577 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); see
also Diaz v. State, No. 13-14-00675-CR, 2017 WL 4987665, at *5 (Tex. App.—Corpus
Christi–Edinburg Nov. 2, 2017, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (erro-
neously reading Contreras to adopt a probable-cause analysis, then relying on the analysis
to find the confession voluntary).
22. Contreras, 312 S.W.3d at 577 n.27 (recognizing that some jurisdictions use a proba-
ble-cause analysis in assessing voluntariness under the Due Process Clause when police
threaten to arrest a defendant’s close family if the defendant does not confess); id. at 577
(declining to adopt a probable-cause analysis under Article 38.23(a) because the defendant
only needed to show that there was an affirmative factual dispute about whether the police
made the threat, which he did, not whether there is probable cause).
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According to the court of criminal appeals, a voluntariness analysis is
necessarily context driven, requiring all the circumstances to be consid-
ered, but it agreed that the existence of probable cause is but a factor in
the analysis:23 “[C]ourts must carefully consider, not only the com-
plained-of statements, but also the context in which they were made, in-
cluding the demeanor of the person who made them and the truth or
falsity of the statements.”24 The high court went on to explain the nuance,
Context is crucial because it informs what the police meant when
they made the complained-of statements. For example, one officer
might mean that police could arrest a suspect’s close family member
“right then” because police had probable cause to do so when the
statement was made. Another officer might mean that they could
arrest the family member in the future because he is a legitimate
suspect, although police do not yet have probable cause. Yet another
might mean that they could arrest the close family member even
though the family member is not suspected of wrongdoing to coerce
the suspect into confessing.25
The court of criminal appeals concluded that all the circumstances
showed that police meant the first possibility: they had probable cause to
arrest the appellant’s wife when they told him that, if he did not confess,
they might arrest his wife or both of them.26 In addition to the existence
of probable cause, however, the court noted that the record supported
the trial court’s findings that the appellant voluntarily went to the police
station to give the complained-of statement, where he was advised of his
Miranda/Article 38.22 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure rights,
which he waived.27 It also supported the fact that the appellant was told
that he was not under arrest; that he was not handcuffed; that he was told
that he could leave at any time; that he never asked for food or water;
that police offered the appellant a drink, which he refused; and that the
complained-of interview only lasted about two hours and fifteen min-
utes.28 Part of the time that the appellant was in the interrogation room
he was alone.29
III. SEARCHES & SEIZURES
The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and article I, section
9 of the Texas constitution (article I, section 9) protect persons from un-
reasonable searches and seizures.30 The language of the Fourth Amend-
23. Lopez, 610 S.W.3d at 496–97.
24. Id. at 496.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 498. Police thought that the appellant acted alone, but given that he main-
tained his innocence, they could not rule out that the appellant’s wife killed the victim,
especially since there was no evidence of a break-in, and it showed that the injuries were
likely inflicted by an adult. The appellant and his wife were the only two adults home. Id.
27. Id. at 497.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 9.
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ment and article I, section 9 are nearly identical.31 Despite the similarity,
however, and while the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has relied on
Fourth Amendment interpretations, the court has a duty to interpret the
Texas constitution independently of the U.S. Constitution.32
The central inquiry of the Fourth Amendment and article I, section 9 is
the reasonableness of the search or seizure.33 The totality of the circum-
stances are considered when determining whether a search was reasona-
ble.34 The Fourth Amendment and article I, section 9 also protect certain
privacy interests.35 Under both provisions, a defendant must show that he
had a subjective expectation of privacy in the thing searched and/or
seized that society recognizes as objectively reasonable.36 Both the U.S.
Supreme Court and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals have often held
that a person has no objective expectation of privacy in information the
person voluntarily turns over to a third-party, a standard which has been
referred as the third party doctrine.37
A. REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY
1. Cell Site Location Information
a. Background
The U.S. Supreme Court has explained how Cell Site Location Infor-
mation (CSLI) records are generated and what information they contain:
Cell phones continuously scan their environment looking for the best
signal, which generally comes from the closest cell site. Most modern
devices, such as smartphones, tap into the wireless network several
times a minute whenever their signal is on, even if the owner is not
using one of the phone’s features. Each time the phone connects to a
cell site, it generates a time-stamped record known as cell-site loca-
tion information (CSLI). The precision of this information depends
on the size of the geographic area covered by the cell site. The
greater the concentration of cell sites, the smaller the coverage area.
As data usage from cell phones has increased, wireless carriers have
installed more cell sites to handle the traffic. That has led to increas-
ingly compact coverage areas, especially in urban areas.38
31. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. IV, with TEX. CONST. art. I, § 9.
32. Holder v. State, 595 S.W.3d 691, 697 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020) (citing DEBATES IN
THE TEXAS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1875, at 45 (Seth Shepard McKay ed.
1875)).
33. Id. at 704; see Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 381–82 (2014) (quoting Brigham
City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006)).
34. See, e.g., Foreman v. State, 613 S.W.3d 160, 164 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020).
35. See, e.g., Love v. State, 543 S.W.3d 835, 840 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016); Ford v. State,
477 S.W.3d 321, 322 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015).
36. See, e.g., Love, 543 S.W.3d at 840–41; Ford, 477 S.W.3d at 328.
37. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979); State v. Martinez, 570 S.W.3d 278,
287–88 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019).
38. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 211–12 (2018).
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2. Holder v. State
In Holder, the “[a]ppellant and his girlfriend, Casey James, moved into
Billy Tanner’s home with James’s two children.”39 Tanner was James’s ex-
stepfather.40 A few months after they moved in, the appellant and James
broke up, and the appellant moved out.41 A month or so later, James
asked the appellant if he had ever seen Tanner act inappropriately around
her children because one of her daughters said that Tanner “was ‘nasty’
and that he slept without his underwear.”42 The appellant and James did
not speak for a few days, but when they spoke again, she told him that
she was going out of town the following weekend and that her kids were
going to stay with one of her friends.43 When James returned home, she
immediately sensed that something was wrong.44 She entered the house
and noticed some unusual things that scared her, so she went back to her
car and called her mother, who told her to call police.45
Police found Tanner’s body in the house.46 He had been stabbed
twenty times and suffered blunt-force trauma to the head.47 While look-
ing around the house, police found two black latex gloves on the kitchen
table, which James said were not hers or Tanner’s.48 The next day police
obtained historical CSLI for the appellant’s phone, then interviewed
him.49 Although the records showed that the appellant was near Tanner’s
home when police thought that Tanner had been killed, he claimed that
he was working at his shop in another town.50 When police told the ap-
pellant about the CSLI, the appellant changed his story.51 After develop-
ing more inculpatory evidence, the police arrested the appellant, and he
was charged with capital murder.52
Police obtained the appellant’s CSLI through the federal Stored Com-
munications Act, under which CSLI information can be obtained on a
showing of “specific and articulable facts . . . that there are reasonable
grounds to believe that the . . . records or other information sought, are
relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.”53
The appellant filed two motions to suppress, arguing that police vio-
lated the Stored Communications Act, the Fourth Amendment, and arti-
cle I, section 9 when they searched and seized his historical CSLI records.
The motions were denied, and the trial court’s ruling was affirmed on









48. Id. at 695.
49. Id. at 695–96.
50. Id. at 696.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 693.
53. Id.; 18 U.S.C.A. § 2703(d) (West 2021).
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appeal.54
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals ruled against the appellant on
the Stored Communications Act claim, relying on a case it decided
shortly before in which it held that the Act specifically excluded suppres-
sion as a remedy in most scenarios, including this one.55 It then turned to
the article I, section 9 issue. The court noted that the Fourth Amendment
and article I, section 9 are almost identically worded and that it had relied
on Fourth Amendment jurisprudence before to interpret article I, section
9, especially in recent years.56 The court also said that, even though it
independently interprets the Texas constitution, it will not interpret the
Texas constitution differently than the Fourth Amendment just because it
can.57 The court also considered the constitutional debates in Texas to
determine if the founders expressed any views about the relationship be-
tween the Fourth Amendment and article I, section 9.58 It concluded that
the evidence showed that the framers intended for article I, section 9 to
provide at least as much protection as the Fourth Amendment.59
The court then turned to Carpenter to determine whether the U.S. Su-
preme Court’s reasoning was persuasive, and it concluded that it was.60
According to the Supreme Court, CSLI implicated two lines of cases:
those dealing with a person’s expectation of privacy in their physical loca-
tion and movements and the third-party doctrine.61 The court said that
both lines of cases were distinguishable, however, because neither dealt
with the “the qualitatively different category of cell-site records.”62 It rea-
soned that a cell phone is “almost a ‘feature of human anatomy’” that
“tracks nearly exactly the movements of its owner” and that, because
wireless carriers keep those constantly and automatically generated
records for up to five years, “[w]hoever the suspect turns out to be, he has
effectively been tailed every moment of every day for five years.”63
54. Holder v. State, No. 05-15-00818-CR, 2016 WL 4421362, at *10–13 (Tex. App.—
Dallas Aug. 19, 2016, pet. granted) (not designated for publication).
55. Holder, 595 S.W.3d at 697 (citing Sims v. State, 569 S.W.3d 634, 642 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2019)). Even if the “specific and articulable facts” standard in the Stored Communi-
cations Act was violated, suppression is available only for constitutional violations. Id.
56. Id. at 697–98.
57. Id. at 701–02.
58. Id. at 702.
59. Id. at 702–03.
60. Id. at 701.
61. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2215–16 (2018).
62. Id. at 2216–17; see United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 285 (1983) (the monitor-
ing of a person’s location through a beeper was not a search under the Fourth Amendment
if the transmitter is in a public place); United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404 (2012)
(expectation of privacy violated when GPS device was attached to defendant’s private
property); see also United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 436–37 (1976) (copies of financial
documents under government subpoena not a Fourth Amendment search in case of tax
evasion); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979) (third-party doctrine applies to
dialed phone numbers in which a person has no reasonable expectation of privacy because
they run through the phone company).
63. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2218.
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Convinced of the logic of the Supreme Court’s reasoning, the court of
criminal appeals held “that the third-party doctrine alone cannot defeat a
[defendant’s] expectation of privacy in at least [twenty-three] days of [his]
historical CSLI under [a]rticle I, [s]ection 9.”64 The next question was
whether the search was reasonable.65 The court concluded that it was not
because even the State conceded that the petition for the records did not
allege probable cause, and police did not allege exigent circumstances or
some other special law enforcement need to conduct a warrantless search
and seizure.66 The police were simply following up on a claimed alibi and
petitioned to obtain the records of the cell phone, claiming that the cell
phone “was used by a possible suspect to communicate with unknown
persons and obtaining the locations of the handset will allow investigators
to identify if this suspect was in the area at the time of the offense and
will provide investigators leads in this case.”67
The court subsequently remanded the case to the Fifth Dallas Court of
Appeals to conduct a harm analysis.68 The concurring and dissenting
opinion agreed that the appellant was not entitled to suppress the histori-
cal CSLI under the Stored Communications Act, but he disagreed with
the court’s decision to no longer apply the third-party doctrine.69 He ac-
cused the majority of “slavishly following Carpenter,” and he asserted
that the court of criminal appeals has no authority to reconsider its own
decisions interpreting the Texas constitution.70 According to the author, if
the court errs in interpreting the Texas constitution, the only recourse is
for the people to amend the Texas constitution.71
3. Dixon v. State
In Dixon v. State, the appellant was accused of hiring an acquaintance
to kill someone who was dating his ex-girlfriend.72 As part of their inves-
tigation, police obtained historical CSLI records for the appellant’s cell
phone. Records showed the appellant was in the same area of Lubbock as
the victim, but on a different day and months apart.73 Police believed that
the records were still probative to support a theory that the appellant was
collaborating with his co-conspirator when they were both in Lubbock.74
The appellant filed a motion to suppress the historical CSLI, citing the
Fourth Amendment; article I, section 9; Article 38.23 of the Texas Code
of Criminal Procedure; and the federal Stored Communications Act.75
64. Holder, 595 S.W.3d at 703.
65. Id. at 704.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 704 n.27.
68. Id. at 704.
69. Id. at 705–09 (Yeary, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
70. Id. at 705.
71. Id.
72. Dixon v. State, 595 S.W.3d 216, 218 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020).
73. Id. at 218–19.
74. Id. at 218.
75. Dixon v. State, 566 S.W.3d 348, 363 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2018, pet. granted).
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Although the trial court denied the motion, the Seventh Amarillo Court
of Appeals reversed and remanded based on Carpenter.76 According to
the court of appeals, the historical CSLI was used as complicity and im-
peachment evidence, and without the historical CSLI, there was no evi-
dence that the appellant was ever in the area with his friend “for any
purpose.”77
On discretionary review, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals re-
versed.78 It concluded that, even if admission of the records violated the
appellant’s expectation of privacy, he was not harmed and that the court
of appeals misapplied the constitutional harm standard.79 According to
the high court, while the State used the historical CLSI to impeach the
appellant’s credibility, other impeachment evidence was also admitted.80
Also, the records supported the appellant’s argument that he was not pre-
sent when the victim was murdered, but the court said that the appellant’s
location on the day in question was not material to his case-in-chief be-
cause this was a murder-for-hire offense, and the appellant conceded that
he hired someone “to track and photograph the victim.”81
In a concurring opinion, agreeing with the disposition of the case, it
was separately opined that article I, section 9 claims, unlike Fourth
Amendment claims, should be analyzed for non-constitutional harm, and
according to her, the court should overrule its decision in Love to the
contrary.82 While the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule is inherent in
the Fourth Amendment, it was stated that, the court of criminal appeals
has held that there is no exclusionary rule inherent in article I, section 9;
rather, the general exclusionary rule in Texas is statutory, and a statutory
violation is reviewed for non-constitutional harm.83
B. REASONABLE SUSPICION
1. Kansas v. Glover
In Kansas v. Glover, a sheriff’s deputy ran a license plate check on a
pickup truck and saw that the registered owner’s driver’s license had been
revoked.84 The deputy could not see who was driving the truck, but as-
suming that it was the registered owner, the deputy initiated a traffic
76. Id. at 363–64.
77. Dixon, 595 S.W.3d at 218–19.
78. Id. at 217.
79. Id. at 219.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 220.
82. Id. at 225–26 (Hervey, J., concurring) (citing Love v. State, 543 S.W.3d 835, 845
(Tex. Crim. App. 2016)). After remand, the court of appeals again affirmed the ruling of
the trial court, finding that the constitutional harm standard had been satisfied. It noted
Judge Hervey’s concurring opinion but said that it was required to follow Love as binding
precedent. Holder v. State, No. 05-15-00818-CR, 2020 WL 7350627, at *3 (Tex. App.—
Dallas Dec. 15, 2020). The State filed a petition for discretionary review, citing Judge Her-
vey’s concurring opinion, and the court granted the State’s petition. The case is currently
pending at the court.
83. Id. at 226; see TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.23; TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(a).
84. Kansas v. Glover, 140 S. Ct. 1183, 1187–88 (2020).
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stop.85 It turned out that the petitioner was driving his vehicle, so the
deputy arrested him, and the petitioner was charged with driving as a
habitual violator.86 He moved to suppress the evidence, claiming that the
deputy lacked reasonable suspicion to initiate the stop.87 The trial court
granted the motion, but the court of appeals reversed because “there
were specific and articulable facts from which the officer’s common-sense
inference gave rise to a reasonable suspicion.”88 The Supreme Court of
Kansas then reversed the court of appeals because it found the officer’s
inference that the petitioner was committing a crime was merely on “a
hunch.”89
The State petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari.
The Supreme Court agreed to hear the case, and it agreed with the court
of appeals and reversed the Kansas Supreme Court. According to it, the
deputy’s inference that the registered owner of the truck was probably
driving was reasonable,90 and because the registered owner’s driver’s li-
cense had been revoked, it followed that the deputy had reasonable sus-
picion to believe that the petitioner was committing a crime by driving
while his license was revoked.91 The Supreme Court did not believe that
“[t]he fact that the registered owner of a vehicle is not always the driver
of the vehicle does not negate the reasonableness”92 of the deputy’s infer-
ence, and it noted that reasonable-suspicion determinations “depend[ ]
on the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which rea-
sonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.”93 Instead, police
officers are permitted to make “commonsense judgments and inferences
about human behavior.”94
The Supreme Court also rejected the idea raised by the concurring and
dissenting opinions (Justice Kagan and Justice Sotomayor, respectively)
that it was unreasonable to infer that the petitioner was driving his truck
because people whose driver’s licenses are suspended are less likely to
drive.95 According to it, empirical data supported its conclusion, showing
that drivers whose licenses are suspended or revoked often continue driv-
ing.96 One study it cited asserted that 75% of such drivers continue to
drive.97 The Supreme Court also relied on Kansas statutes directed at
people whose licenses had been suspended multiple times or revoked as
evidence that the Kansas Legislature also believed that many of those
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1186.
87. Id. at 1187.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1188.
91. Id.
92. Id.
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people will continue to drive.98
The Supreme Court was careful to emphasize the narrow scope of its
holding and to point out that the presence of other facts might change the
outcome.99 One example it gave is if the registered owner was an older
man, but a young woman was driving.100 At the time of this Article, only
two Texas courts have cited to this opinion.101
Justice Kagan wrote a concurring opinion in which Justice Ginsburg
joined.102 Justice Kagan agreed with the majority that, generally, a person
could reasonably infer that the owner of a vehicle is probably driving it,
but she did not think that held true if the owner did not have a valid
driver’s license because it is not clear whether drivers whose licenses have
been suspended or revoked would continue driving.103 Nonetheless, she
agreed with the majority’s reliance on studies showing that they do.104
Ultimately, she agreed with the majority that the deputy had reasonable
suspicion to initiate the traffic stop.105
Justice Sotomayor wrote in dissent.106 She disagreed with the major-
ity’s reliance on studies because it shifted the analysis from whether there
is individualized reasonable suspicion to a general suspicion that must be
dispelled by the petitioner: If police run the license plate of a car and see
that the owner’s license is revoked, they can initiate a traffic stop without
any other information.107 She also believed that a reasonableness deter-
mination under the Fourth Amendment should not turn on the common
sense of an ordinary person, but from the perspective of a reasonable
officer’s assessment.108
C. SEARCH WARRANTS
“The cornerstone of the Fourth Amendment and its Texas equivalent is
that a magistrate shall not issue a search warrant without first finding
probable cause that a particular item will be found in a particular loca-
tion.”109 There are two exceptions to the warrant requirement addressed
in this Article: searches incident to arrest and the good-faith exception.
98. Id. at 1188–89.
99. Id. at 1191.
100. Id.
101. See Garcia v. State, No. 08-19-00176-CR, 2021 WL 235658, at *10 (Tex. App.—El
Paso Jan. 25, 2021, no pet.) (not designated for publication); State v. Zubiate, No. 08-19-
00215-CR, 2020 WL 5105805, at *8 (Tex. App.—El Paso Aug. 31, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.,
not designated for publication).
102. Glover, 140 S. Ct. at 1191–94 (Kagan, J., concurring).
103. Id. at 1191–92.
104. Id. at 1192.
105. Id. at 1194.
106. Id. at 1194–98 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
107. Id. at 1195 (“For starters, the majority flips the burden of proof. It permits Kansas
police officers to effectuate roadside stops whenever they lack ‘information negating an
inference’ that a vehicle’s unlicensed owner is its driver.”).
108. Id. at 1196.
109. Foreman v. State, 613 S.W.3d 160, 163 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020); see U.S. CONST.
amend. IV; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 9; see also TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 18.01(b)
(“No search warrant shall issue for any purpose in this state unless sufficient facts are first
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Under the Fourth Amendment, probable cause exists when the facts
and circumstances known to law enforcement are “sufficient in them-
selves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense
has been or is being committed.”110 Thus, a probable-cause affidavit for a
search warrant is sufficient if the facts therein “justify a conclusion that
the property that is the object of the search probably is on the . . . prem-
ises to be searched at the time the warrant issues.”111 Reviewing courts
should give great deference to a magistrate’s finding of probable cause
and should defer to all reasonable inferences that the magistrate could
have made.112 “In determining whether a warrant sufficiently establishes
probable cause, this Court is bound by the four corners of the
affidavit.”113
Generally, “a search warrant must be executed within three days from
the time of its issuance” except that it “shall be executed within a shorter
period if so directed in the warrant by the magistrate.”114 A warrant must
be executed within fifteen whole days if it issued solely to search for and
seize specimens from a specific person for DNA analysis and comparison,
including blood and saliva samples, and a warrant must be executed
within ten whole days if it issued under Article 18B.354 of the Texas Code
of Criminal Procedure, which deals with access to stored communications
and other stored customer data.115
1. Probable Cause
a. Crider v. State
In Crider v. State, the issue was whether the police had probable cause
to seize and test blood samples.116 Robert Lee Crider, Jr., the appellant,
was arrested for suspicion of driving while intoxicated (DWI) and the
arresting officer sought and received a warrant to take a sample of his
blood.117 The warrant did not include an express authorization to test his
blood-alcohol concentration (BAC), only its extraction.118 In a motion to
suppress, the appellant challenged the admission of the results of his BAC
test, but the trial court denied his motion.119
On appeal, the appellant did not attack the validity of the search war-
rant to obtain his blood, but he challenged the admission of his BAC test
presented to satisfy the issuing magistrate that probable cause does in fact exist for its
issuance.”).
110. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176–77 (1949) (quoting Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925)).
111. Massey v. State, 933 S.W.2d 141, 148 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (quoting Hass v.
State, 790 S.W.2d 609, 612 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990)).
112. Rodriguez v. State, 232 S.W.3d 55, 61 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
113. State v. Elrod, 538 S.W.3d 551, 556 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017).
114. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 18.06(a), 18.07(a)(3).
115. Id. art. 18.07(a)(1), (a)(2); see TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 18B.354.
116. Crider v. State, 607 S.W.3d 305, 305–06 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020).
117. Id. at 306.
118. Id.
119. Id.
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under State v. Martinez.120 In Martinez, the Texas Court of Criminal Ap-
peals reaffirmed that the physical extraction and the testing of blood are
two distinct invasions of privacy under the Fourth Amendment.121 The
appellant therefore challenged the chemical testing of the blood.122 The
Fourth San Antonio Court of Appeals acknowledged the dual privacy in-
terest distinction for the extraction and the testing of blood, but found
that it was a reasonable inference that the blood is being drawn to test
it.123
On discretionary review, the appellant argued that the court of appeals
erred, and he renewed his argument that the results of the blood testing
should have been suppressed.124 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
held, however, that the warrant issued by the magistrate was based on
probable cause to justify the seizure of the appellant’s blood for its evi-
dentiary value that he was intoxicated and that the same determination is
sufficient to also justify the testing of the blood.125 The court of criminal
appeals also addressed the information relied on by the magistrate to is-
sue the warrant.126 According to the court, “[t]he officer noticed that
[the] [a]ppellant exhibited a strong odor of alcohol, glassy and bloodshot
eyes, an unsteady gait, and slow, slurry speech.”127
In a concurring opinion, the author stated that, under a common sense
reading of the warrant, the seizure of the appellant’s blood and the test-
ing of it for BAC was within the scope of both the search warrant and
affidavit.128 In affirming the judgment of the court of appeals, the court
deferred to the reasonable inferences that the magistrate made when au-
thorizing the seizure of the blood as to also authorize its testing.129 The
dissent expressed concern that, although there was “probable cause to
test the blood,” he disagreed that the warrant authorized testing the
blood.130
The petitioner filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the U.S. Su-
preme Court. A response was filed, and the petition was distributed to
the justices during the February 19, 2021 conference. On February 22,
2021, the Supreme Court denied certiorari.
b. Foreman v. State
In Foreman v. State, the appellant and some accomplices retaliated
against two men who tried to run a money scam on him by torturing the
120. Id.; see State v. Martinez, 570 S.W.3d 278 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019).
121. Martinez, 570 S.W.3d at 291.
122. Crider, 607 S.W.3d at 306; see Martinez, 570 S.W.3d at 290.
123. Crider, 607 S.W.3d at 307.
124. Id. at 306.
125. Id. at 308.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 306.
128. Id. at 310 (Newell, J., concurring).
129. Id. at 309–11.
130. Id. at 312 (Walker, J., dissenting).
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two men in his auto shop.131 The police obtained a warrant to search the
business, and the warrant authorized the police to seize “‘any and all . . .
surveillance video and/or video equipment’ from the business.”132 The
warrant also stated that “any and all items constituting evidence consti-
tuting aggravated assault and robbery that may be found” at the auto
shop could be seized.133 Surveillance footage from a confiscated hard
drive showed the offense occurring inside the auto shop.134
The appellant filed a motion to suppress and argued that the admission
of the footage violated the Fourth Amendment; article I, section 9; and
Article 18 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure because there was no
probable cause to obtain the footage based on the warrant issued (i.e., the
search was unreasonable). The trial court denied the motion.135
On direct appeal, Foreman argued that the trial court erred, but a di-
vided appeals panel affirmed.136 The Fourteenth Houston Court of Ap-
peals, however, granted en banc review and reversed, holding that the
affidavit failed to support a finding of probable cause to seize the surveil-
lance equipment and footage.137 Under a “common knowledge” rule, the
court found that it was not so-well known to the public as to be beyond
dispute that the auto shop would contain surveillance equipment.138 The
State argued that the equipment was properly seized because it was in
plain view, but the court of appeals disagreed. Turning to the harm issue,
the court of appeals found that the erroneous admission of the footage
was harmful and reversed the conviction.139
The State filed a petition for discretionary review,140 arguing that it was
a reasonable inference for the magistrate to believe that there would be
surveillance equipment inside the auto shop.141 The Texas Court of Crim-
inal Appeals began its analysis by noting different standards applied to
the Fourth Amendment; article I, section 9; and Article 18.01 Texas Code
of Criminal Procedure.142 While the language of the Fourth Amendment
and article I, section 9 is similarly worded, the majority noted, probable
cause under the Fourth Amendment requires that the facts submitted to
the magistrate must be “sufficient to justify [the] conclusion that the ob-
ject of the search is probably on the premises to be searched at the time
the warrant is issued.”143 The test only demands that there is a “fair
131. Foreman v. State, 613 S.W.3d 160, 161–62 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020).
132. Id. at 161.
133. Id. at 162.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 162–63.
137. Id. at 163.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. The State advanced three arguments, but the court addressed only one of them
because it granted relief.
141. Id. at 163–64.
142. Id. at 163.
143. Id. (quoting Davis v. State, 202 S.W.3d 149, 154 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006)).
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probability” that the location would yield a particular item.144 Under arti-
cle I, section 9, however, the proper test is “[w]hether, under the totality
of the circumstances and in light of the ‘public and private interests that
are at stake,’ the search or seizure was ‘reasonable.’”145
The court observed that magistrates are allowed to draw reasonable
inferences from facts articulated in the affidavit146 and that they can use
“common knowledge.”147 The court found that the magistrate reasonably
inferred that facts articulated in the affidavit supported a common-knowl-
edge conclusion that a business like an auto shop would probably have
surveillance equipment.148 Thus, the court reversed the judgment of the
court of appeals and affirmed the appellant’s conviction.149
c. Diaz v. State
In Diaz v. State, Nelson Garcia Diaz was convicted of burglary of a
habitation. He and another person broke into an off-duty police officer’s
home.150 The appellant shared information about the incident with an
acquaintance—a confidential informant working for the Drug Enforce-
ment Agency (DEA)—and the DEA learned that the appellant had out-
standing warrants in Georgia for armed robbery and kidnapping. A
multi-agency task force subsequently arrested the appellant.151 The ap-
pellant had five cell phones, all of which were seized. Only three of the
phones were at issue in this case.152 After a hearing, the trial court
credited the testimony of the officers and denied the motion. Subse-
quently, the data pulled from the appellant’s cell phones, directly linking
him to the home invasion, was admitted.153
On appeal, the appellant made several arguments.154 First, he argued
that there was an insufficient nexus between the cell phones and the
home invasion to support a search warrant for the cell phones.155 The
Fourteenth Houston Court of Appeals found, however, that a magistrate
could have reasonably inferred from the allegations in the probable-cause
affidavit that three of the cell phones likely were used before, during, or
after the commission of the home invasion.156 The affidavit said that po-
lice found parts of a broken cell phone or phones and a pair of sunglasses
at the scene, that the sunglasses had DNA on them, and that the appel-
144. Id. (quoting Rodriguez v. State, 232 S.W.3d 55, 60 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)).
145. Id. at 164 (quoting Holder v. State, 595 S.W.3d 691, 704 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020)).
146. Id. at 166 (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 240 (1983)).
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 167.
150. Diaz v. State, 604 S.W.3d 595, 598 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, pet.
granted).
151. Id. at 599.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 599–600.
154. Id. at 600.
155. Id. at 603.
156. Id. at 603–04 (citing Foreman v. State, 561 S.W.3d 218, 237–38 (Tex. App.—Hous-
ton [14th Dist.] 2018, pet. granted)).
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lant could not be excluded as the donor.157 According to the court, the
magistrate could have reasonably inferred that the DNA evidence “di-
rectly” tied the appellant to the crime scene and that the “appellant was
the owner of both the sunglasses and the cell phone or phones from
which pieces detached during the offense and were left at the scene.”158
The court continued that, because “the affidavit provided that appellant
was associated with at least two phone numbers and that police recovered
a total of five cell phones in [the] appellant’s immediate possession or
control upon his arrest,” “[t]he magistrate reasonably could infer that
[the] appellant utilized these phones interchangeably and that evidence of
criminal activity on one phone could have been transferred to
another.”159
The appellant also asserted that the State violated Franks v. Delaware
when the officer who drafted the affidavit claimed to rely on an anony-
mous source from a criminal informant when, in fact, the informant was
not anonymous. According to the appellant, misrepresenting the source
of the information was a material misstatement.160 Under Franks (and
Janecka v. State):
any evidence obtained pursuant to [an] arrest warrant must be sup-
pressed if (1) the defendant can establish by a preponderance of the
evidence that the affidavit supporting the warrant contains a material
misstatement that the affiant made knowingly, intentionally, or with
reckless disregard for the truth; and (2) excising the false statement,
the affidavit’s remaining content is insufficient to establish probable
cause.161
The court of appeals acknowledged the misrepresentation, but it said that
the misrepresentation was not material to the probable-cause analysis
under Janecka if the information from the informant is “essentially true,”
which it was here.162
The appellant filed a petition for discretionary review presenting the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals with two grounds for review, but the
court granted only the first one, which states, “Does intentionally mis-
describing an untested confidential informant as an ‘anonymous source’
in a probable cause affidavit cause the informant’s uncorroborated in-
criminating information to be excised pursuant to Franks?”163
The parties have filed their briefs, and the Court will hand down an
opinion in the future.
157. Id. at 604.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 600 (citing Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 154 (1978)).
161. Id. at 600 (citing Franks, 438 U.S. at 155–56; Janecka v. State, 937 S.W.2d 456, 462
(Tex. Crim. App. 1996)).
162. Id. at 602 (citing Janecka, 937 S.W.2d at 463).
163. Brief for Appellant at 6, Diaz v. State, No. 14-17-00685-CR (Tex. Crim. App. filed
Dec. 8, 2020).
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2. Scope of a Warrant
a. Lamb v. State
In Lamb v. State, the appellant had been exchanging sexually explicit
messages on social media with a fifteen-year-old girl.164 When her mother
found out, the girl attempted suicide, and law enforcement became in-
volved.165 Officer Jeremy Massey drafted a probable-cause affidavit to
search the appellant’s property.166 A warrant was issued instructing of-
ficers to search the address specified in the affidavit “and there search for
the property described in said affidavit and to seize same named in the
affidavit.”167 Investigating officers then executed the warrant at the prop-
erty. While the search was underway, the appellant pulled up in his car
somewhere near or on his property.168 The investigating officer thought
that the appellant parked on the property, and even though he knew the
warrant did not authorize a search of the appellant’s person, he seized the
cell phone in the appellant’s back pocket and directed the other officers
to search his vehicle.169 Police discovered a second cell phone and digital
recording equipment along with a pistol.170 The appellant confessed and
was arrested at the scene.171 He was charged with online solicitation of a
minor.172
The appellant filed a motion to suppress in which he argued that the
scope of the warrant did not include his vehicle or the cell phone on his
person. The trial court denied the motion and the appellant appealed.
The appellant claimed that the trial court erred, and he renewed his
argument about his vehicle and person being outside the scope of the
search warrant. The Sixth Texarkana Court of Appeals said that the rule
was that an “officer must show that [he was] properly in the place where
the item was found” based on the warrant (or an exception to the warrant
requirement),173 and here, the court explained, the area being searched
was on a rural country road and the investigating officer did not know
where the property lines were and believed that the appellant pulled onto
the property in his car.174 It also noted that the warrant specifically au-
thorized the search of any and all motor vehicles located on the prem-
ises175 and that, even though the officer might have been mistaken about
164. Lamb v. State, 603 S.W.3d 152, 155 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2020, no pet.).
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 156. The investigating officer said that he had probable cause to believe that
he would find cell phones, computers, and digital media storage devices that may contain
“sexually explicit material and messages with a minor child,” and he requested “a search






172. Id. at 155.
173. Id. at 157 (citing Snider v. State, 681 S.W.2d 60, 63 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984)).
174. Id.
175. Id.
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whether or not the appellant’s vehicle was actually on the premises, the
court could not find the search constitutionally impermissible unless it
was unreasonable.176 The court concluded that the officer’s search of the
appellant’s car was reasonable and within the scope of the warrant be-
cause the warrant authorized the search of all vehicles on the property.177
The test is one of sufficient probability and not certainty.178
On the other hand, the court of appeals found that the investigator’s
search of the appellant violated the Fourth Amendment.179 The appellant
argued that Ybarra v. Illinois requires a special connection to the prem-
ises, which he did not have, and that police had no other basis to search
him.180 The court of appeals disagreed because the affidavit described the
appellant as having control over the premises,181 but it said that he was
only subject to detention incident to the execution of the search warrant;
he was not, however, subject to be searched.182 It further said that, be-
cause the State did not introduce evidence that an exception to the war-
rant requirement applied, and the court could find no applicable
exception to the warrant requirement evidence, the search was unconsti-
tutional.183 Having found error, the court of appeals turned to the issue of
harm, and it held that the appellant was harmed under the constitutional-
harm standard.184 It reasoned that there was no record evidence to show
what was on the phone, so the court could not say beyond a reasonable
doubt that the error was harmless, and it reversed the judgment of the
trial court and remanded for a new trial.185
3. Three Day Warrant Requirement
In Ramirez v. State, the appellant, Stephen Ramirez, was convicted of a
felony DWI. In his motion to suppress, one argument concerned whether
a search warrant is considered executed when police seize a blood sample
within the warrant-execution window, but the chemical analysis was not
performed until the window closed.186 The trial court denied the motion,
and the appellant appealed.
According to the Fourteenth Houston Court of Appeals, the issue was
“what it means to ‘execute’ a search warrant pursuant to [c]hapter 18 of
176. Id. at 158.
177. Id.
178. Id. (citing Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 185 (1990)).
179. Id. at 161.
180. Id. at 159; see Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 90–91 (1979) (finding that the search
of the petitioner was invalid because officers had no reason to believe Ybarra had any
special connection to the premises).
181. Lamb, 603 S.W.3d at 159–60.
182. Id. at 160 (citing Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 695 (1981)).
183. Id.
184. Id. at 162; TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(a); see also Hernandez v. State, 60 S.W.3d 106, 108
(Tex. Crim. App. 2001).
185. Lamb, 603 S.W.3d at 162–63.
186. Ramirez v. State, 611 S.W.3d 645, 647 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, pet.
ref’d).
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the Code of Criminal Procedure.”187 Does it mean to seize the blood
sample within the warrant-execution window for later chemical analysis?
Or does it mean to seize and analyze the blood sample within the war-
rant-execution window? The court of appeals concluded that “the three-
day requirement for the execution of a search warrant sets the limit for
the actual search for and seizure of the evidence by a peace officer, not
the timing for any subsequent forensic analysis that may be conducted on
the seized evidence.”188 The court reasoned that, under Article 18.09 of
the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, once the items have been seized
under a warrant, they must be taken before the magistrate189 and chapter
18 of the Code of Criminal Procedure only governs searches and seizures,
not what happens to the evidence that is searched and/or seized.190 It also
pointed that its “conclusion fits within the purpose of time restrictions on
the execution of search warrants, which is to ensure that probable cause,
as found by the neutral magistrate who signs the warrant, continues to
exist.”191 After disposing of the appellant’s other grounds, the court af-
firmed the judgment of the trial court.192
4. Exceptions to the Warrant Requirement
a. Good Faith Exception
In State v. Arellano, the magistrate’s signature on a search warrant was
illegible.193 The question was whether the officer who executed the war-
rant acted in good faith even though the magistrate’s signature was
illegible.194
Arellano was detained, then arrested and subsequently charged with
DWI.195 After his arrest, a probable-cause affidavit was obtained to
search the appellant’s blood.196 The magistrate issued a warrant to search,
and it was executed. The magistrate was not identified on the warrant
except where it was illegibly signed on the line stating, “Magistrate, Vic-
toria County, Texas.”197 The appellee argued that the search warrant was
“facially invalid because the magistrate’s signature was illegible in viola-
tion of [Article 18.04(5) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure].”198
Article 18.04(5) requires that, along with the signature, the magistrate’s
name must also clearly appear on the warrant either handwritten or
typed.199 At the hearing, the appellee offered the affidavit and warrant
187. Id. at 651.
188. Id. at 651–52.
189. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 18.09.
190. Ramirez, 611 S.W.3d at 651–52.
191. Id. at 652.
192. Id. at 654.
193. State v. Arellano, 600 S.W.3d 53, 54–55 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020).
194. Id. at 54.
195. Id. at 54–55.
196. Id. at 54.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 55.
199. Id.; TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 18.04(5).
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into evidence.200 The State did not rebut the appellee’s argument that the
magistrate’s signature on the warrant was illegible,201 but it argued that
the good-faith exception in Article 38.23(b) of the Texas Code of Crimi-
nal Procedure controlled.202 Article 38.23(b) allows for the exemption of
evidence from suppression when the “evidence was obtained by a law
enforcement officer acting in objective good faith reliance upon a warrant
issued by a neutral magistrate based on probable cause.”203 The State
argued that the illegible signature should be treated like any other techni-
cal defect and should not be invalidated because the sworn affidavit also
provides support that the officer acted in good faith reliance on the war-
rant.204 The trial court granted the motion and issued written findings of
fact and conclusions of law.205 The trial court found the good-faith excep-
tion inapplicable, reasoning that there cannot be good-faith reliance on a
warrant that is facially invalid.206 It further found that, even if the good-
faith exception applied, there was no abuse of discretion because there
was insufficient evidence to support that the executing officer relied on
the warrant in good faith.207 The Thirteenth Corpus Christi–Edinburg
Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court that the warrant was facially
invalid and that, therefore, the good-faith exception was inapplicable.208
The State filed a petition for discretionary review to the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals, which was granted to consider whether the magis-
trate’s illegible signature invalidated the warrant, and whether the good-
faith exception could apply to a facially invalid warrant.209 The court held
that, while the signature was illegible, the executing officer relied on the
warrant in good faith.210 It reasoned that the signature defect was one of
the reasons that there are statutory exceptions to the suppression rule
found in Article 38.23(b) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.211
The court also pointed out that the court of appeals erroneously plucked
a statement out of a Texas Court of Criminal Appeals opinion that, “[i]n
executing a warrant, [the] officer ‘act[s] in objective good faith reliance
upon’ the warrant, as long as the warrant is facially valid.”212 The court of
criminal appeals found that the lower court wrongly construed this to
mean that an officer could not act in good faith on a facially invalid war-
200. Arellano, 600 S.W.3d at 55.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.23(b).
204. Arellano, 600 S.W.3d at 55.
205. Id. at 56.
206. Id.
207. Id.; see TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 28.01(6) (Suppression hearings are
within the discretion of the trial court.).
208. Arellano, 600 S.W.3d at 56.
209. Id. at 57.
210. Id.
211. Id. (citing Dunn v. State, 951 S.W.2d 478, 479 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)).
212. Id. at 59–60 (citing McClintock v. State, 541 S.W.3d 63, 72–73 (Tex. Crim. App.
2017).
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rant.213 In distinguishing this case, the court of criminal appeals held that
Article 15.02 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure only required the
signature of a magistrate for an arrest warrant to be sufficient.214 The
court of appeals was found to have erred, and the case was remanded to
address appellee’s remaining issues.215
b. Exigent Circumstances
In Igboji v. State, the Fourteenth Houston Court of Appeals had to
decide whether the warrantless seizure of the appellant’s cell phone was
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.216
Jerel Chinedu Igboji, the appellant, participated in a robbery of a Ken-
tucky Fried Chicken where he worked as an employee.217 During the in-
vestigation, an employee shared a Snapchat video with a detective posted
by the appellant showing law enforcement present at the scene after the
robbery.218 After the appellant agreed to provide a statement at the po-
lice department, police seized his cell phone without a warrant.219 A war-
rant was obtained two days later, and the appellant was arrested about a
month later.220 He was charged with aggravated robbery.221
The appellant filed a motion to suppress, which the trial court denied,
and a jury found him guilty.222 The appellant appealed, arguing that his
cell phone was not only unreasonably seized but also unreasonably
searched because police did not have a warrant and no warrant exception
applied.223 The court of appeals concluded, however, that the appellant
did not preserve his claim that the search of his cell phone was unreason-
able.224 It proceeded to consider the merits of the appellant’s argument
that the seizure of his phone was unreasonable.
The investigating detective testified that Snapchat is an application that
allows the sharing of videos or images for a period of time chosen by the
sender and that, before the video or image expires, the recipient can save
the video or image.225 He also said that he interviewed the appellant be-
cause of the video he posted on Snapchat226 and that the appellant’s
phone was seized after he refused to consent for police to search the con-
tents of his phone to “preserve whatever was on the device.”227 The
213. Id. at 61.
214. Id. at 60.
215. Id. at 62.
216. Igboji v. State, 607 S.W.3d 157, 162–63 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, pet.
granted).
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detective testified that he did not obtain a search warrant before the in-
terview because he hoped that the appellant would consent to the
search.228 A forensic examiner also testified to the workings of Snapchat
supporting the officer’s opinion that any evidence would quickly be de-
leted but could be recovered if done swiftly.229
The court first considered whether the seizure of the cell phone was
consensual or exigent circumstances applied.230 The court readily con-
cluded that the appellant did not consent to a search of his phone; that
evidence was undisputed.231 But it also found that the exigent circum-
stances did not exist to support a reasonable inference that the appellant
would have taken affirmative steps to delete content stored in his cell
phone.232 According to the court of appeals, the State had to either prove
that the evidence will naturally dissipate or that the evidence may be de-
stroyed through the affirmative conduct of the suspect,233 and it found
the evidence insufficient in both respects.234 The court found the State’s
evidence insufficient because it did not prove that the officer who seized
the phone had a reasonable belief at the time that he seized it that the
video on the appellant’s phone would expire if the phone was not
seized.235 The court noted there was no evidence “showing the specific
details of the Snapchat application” with respect to the appellant’s cell
phone, and the court noted, the phone was not seized until three days
after the robbery when the video was posted.236
Turning to the argument that the evidence might have been intention-
ally destroyed by the appellant if his phone was not seized, the court of
appeals relied on the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals’s decision in Tur-
rubiate v. State and its own decision in Gutierrez v. State, and concluded
that the evidence had to show “proof of imminent destruction based on
affirmative conduct,”237 not only that the evidence might or might not be
destroyed. Here, the court of appeals said that it found no evidence that
the appellant took any affirmative steps to destroy evidence on his
phone.238 The court further noted that there was no evidence that the
video could not have been obtained from other sources. The court con-
cluded that the appellant was harmed.239 It determined that it could not
say that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because, with-
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229. Id. at 164.
230. Id. at 166–70.
231. Id. at 166.
232. Id. at 170.
233. Id. at 167.
234. Id. at 167, 170.
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236. Id.
237. Id. at 168–69 (citing Turrubiate v. State, 399 S.W.3d 147, 153 (Tex. Crim. App.
2013); Gutierrez v. State, 585 S.W.3d 599, 610 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, no
pet.)).
238. Id. at 169.
239. Id. at 170–72.
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out the phone evidence, the other evidence was merely circumstantial.240
Accordingly, the court of appeals reversed the ruling of the trial court
and remanded for a new trial.241
The author of the dissent took issue with the majority’s application of
both Turrubiate and Gutierrez.242 He found Turrubiate distinguishable
because it dealt with the warrantless search of a home, not the warrant-
less seizure of personal property243 and that the seizure was based on
exigent circumstances under Gutierrez because the defendants knew they
were suspects.244 The author also noted that other jurisdictions tracked
his analysis.245
The State Prosecuting Attorney’s Office filed a petition for discretion-
ary review, which the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals granted. In its
brief on the merits, the State Prosecuting Attorney argues that the court
of appeals erred because its dissipation analysis was wrong, and prece-
dent does not support an “affirmative conduct” or an “alternative
sources” analysis.246 The case is pending.
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241. Id. at 172; TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(a).
242. Igboji, 607 S.W.3d at 172 (Christopher, J., dissenting).
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246. Brief for State Prosecuting Attorney at 20–29, Igboji v. State, No. PD-0936-20
(Tex. Crim. App. filed Dec. 29, 2020).
